Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts

13 June 2017

Ukraine Blocks Russian Social Networks: Anti-Democratic Move or Antidote to Disinformation?


By: Sergey Sukhankin

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a decree, on May 15, introducing a new package of sanctions against Russian companies and individuals (President.gov.ua, May 15). However, it was the decision to block two extremely popular Russian online social networks—Vkontakte (VK) and Odnoklassniki, embraced by more than 15 million Ukrainians—that produced the most heated debates. To justify their decision, Ukrainian officials argued that these resources are regularly employed by Russia for intelligence-gathering and propaganda purposes (Epravda.com.ua, May 16).

In the immediate aftermath, the Russian Internet space (Runet) lost approximately half of its normal Ukrainian traffic and the number of Ukrainian-based Facebook users increased by 35 percent, whereas the popularity of the Opera browser “went through the roof” (Tns-ua.com, accessed June 5). Notably, Opera features free, built-in virtual private network (VPN) support, allowing the user to mask his or her physical location and thus circumvent geolocation-based restrictions.

The announced ban of Russian social networks does not automatically mean that the Ukrainian government will be actually succeed in blocking this venue for espionage and propaganda operations coming from Moscow. Two main factors must be considered: First, a full eradication of Russian social networks will require both time and money and will not ensue immediately. According to Oleksandr Fedienko, the head of the Ukrainian Internet Association, this process might take up to two years and $1 billion. The first deputy director of the presidential administration, Dmytro Shymkhiv, as well as the head of the association Telecommunication Chamber of Ukraine, Tetiana Popova, both provided a similar assessment (Pravda.com.ua, May 16). Another limitation is based on the fact that, currently, Ukraine lacks “proper mechanisms” for this purpose. This was one of the most immediate challenges emphasized by Ukrianian Lieutenant General Vasyl Grytsak (112.ua, May 22).

9 June 2017

Ukraine in Conflict

DAVID R. MARPLES

This is a book in an unusual format. Like many other scholars working on Ukraine, I followed the events of Euromaidan and its aftermath daily. In my case, I wrote frequent analyses intended for an obscure blog site anticipating that the duration would be relatively short like the Orange Revolution of 2004. As events escalated, however, it became something of a habit. Occasionally I published the pieces in various places, like Open Democracy Russia or New Eastern Europe. But for the most part the articles remained limited to a very small audience. My original blog site was linked to the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS)’ Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine. My commitment was voluntary since I was not employed there full-time, but it was an arrangement of mutual satisfaction and I was supplied with an office and a computer. Earlier I had commissioned others to write articles, such as the Ukrainian publicist Mykola Riabchuk, who focused on the endemic corruption and crime during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (2005-2010). But with the coming of Euromaidan, I was too intrigued by events to allow much space for my fellow scholars and writers.

4 June 2017

Ukraine’s Forever War

By Nolan Peterson 

KYIV, Ukraine—On May 13, an artillery shell fired from within separatist-controlled territory landed in a residential neighborhood of Avdiivka, a front-line town in eastern Ukraine.

Three women and a man were standing outside the home where the shell hit. Elena Aslanova, Olga Kurochkina, Maria Dikaya, and Oleg Borisenko.

They all died. Two children became orphans that day.

That same day, the Eurovision Song Contest finals were held in Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital. Tourists from around the world had flocked to the city for the event. CNN published an article hailing Ukraine as “Eastern Europe’s best-kept travel secret.”

Two weeks later, Eurovision is over and the tourists are gone. But the war is still there, still killing people, as it has for more than three years.

On this day at the end of May, there is a collage of sights and sounds on the Maidan, Kyiv’s central square and epicenter of the 2014 revolution, which overthrew the pro-Russian former president, Viktor Yanukovych.

The Trade Unions Building, which was torched during the revolution, flanks the Maidan. Now, the ruin is covered by an enormous fabric facade that bears the phrase, in English, “Freedom is Our Religion.”

31 May 2017

*** Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real and Imaginable

By Sergey Sukhankin

The outbreak of war in the Donbas region (April 2014) turned Ukraine into one of the main targets of Russian information warfare, information-psychological operations, as well as cyberattacks and electronic warfare. Within the past three years, Ukraine has been subjected to no less than 7,000 cyberattacks. Ukrainian cyber expert Sergey Radkevych recently claimed that “Ukraine is in a state of cyber war with Russia” and that Russian cyber activities pose an existential threat to Ukraine’s national security (Sprotyv.info, May 5).

Furthermore, military clashes in Donbas have once again demonstrated that Russian military strategists and experts believe Electronic Warfare (EW) has become the backbone of “warfare of the future.” Western sources have claimed that from December 2015, Russia started to act much more decisively aiming to “achieve kinetic effects by delivering severe blows to Ukrainian critical infrastructure” (Cna.org, March 2017). Namely, these activities included damaging/destroying command-and-control networks through jamming radio communications, hampering the work of radar systems, and muting GPS signals. The main obstacle, however, was in the lack of concrete proof and factual data pertaining to tools, gadgets and other means used by the Russians while waging EW against Ukraine. But thanks to independent investigations conducted by Ukrainian activists and cyber specialists, it is now possible to speak about Russian involvement in EW against Ukraine as an undisputed fact. And the data presented by the Ukrainians illuminates many points of ambiguity regarding Russia’s use of EW in Donbas.

28 May 2017

Will Ukraine Ever Change?

Tim Judah

President Petro Poroshenko with soldiers in the Luhansk region of eastern Ukraine, April 2017

Denis Voronenkov, a former member of the Russian parliament, was walking out of the Premier Palace Hotel in Kiev on March 23 when he was killed in a hail of bullets. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko immediately blamed the Russian state for his murder. Voronenkov, a former supporter of Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine who was accused of corruption in Russia and then fled to Kiev last year, had been a controversial figure. After his defection, he was given Ukrainian citizenship, denounced Putin and his policies, and, perhaps crucially, testified against Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s former president, who had fled to Russia when he was driven from power during the Maidan revolution of 2014. 

Russian officials denied involvement in Voronenkov’s death, but made clear they had little sympathy for a man they regarded as a traitor. He was just one more casualty of Ukraine’s revolution and its continuing war with Russia. 

21 May 2017

Ukraine in Conflict: An Analytical Chronicle


This text features the forty-one articles and blogs David Marples wrote on Ukraine’s political troubles between 2013 and 20017. More precisely, the text ranges from the Euromaidan protests and eventual uprising to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Ukraine’s two eastern provinces, Donetsk and Luhansk. The topics covered include 1) Ukraine’s attempts at ‘de-communization’; 2) the imposition of the so-called Memory Laws in 2015; and 3) whether the socio-political road Kiev has taken is likely to yield success or failure.

28 April 2017

Americans Are Not Ready to Go to War for Ukraine

Christopher A. Preble

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson committed what amounts to an unconscionable sin in the eyes of many foreign policy watchers when he wondered aloud two weeks ago during a meeting in Lucca, Italy, "Why should U.S. taxpayers be interested in Ukraine?"

The Washington Post’s Anne Applebaum responded with an emphatic, “Yes, Rex Tillerson, U.S. Taxpayers Should Care,” but conceded, with an eye to Tillerson’s corporate roots:

There is no calculation, no balance sheet that can prove any of this. There is nothing that would appeal to a CEO or his shareholders. Whatever we have “invested” in Ukraine...will not show an immediate profit. To see the value of a secure, pro-Western Ukraine, you have to see the value of an alliance going back 70 years.

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, stressed that abandoning Ukraine to Vladimir Putin’s tender mercies could spur more states to pursue nuclear weapons. Ukraine was encouraged, under the Budapest Memorandum of December 1994, to relinquish its nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in exchange for security assurances from both Russia and the United States.

20 April 2017

Russian Operations in Ukraine

By MWI Staff

What is Russia really up to in Ukraine?

That was the question addressed during a recent event at West Point by Dr. Phillip Karber, president of the Potomac Foundation. Dr. Karber spoke to cadets and faculty about current Russian operations, the Kremlin’s ultimate objectives, and the implications for the United States of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. His observations are based on twenty-five trips to the region, including 177 days spent with Ukrainian forces on the front lines.

Karber avoids the term “hybrid warfare” to describe Russian actions, he says, because it connotes only a narrow part of a much broader spectrum of what Russia itself calls “New Generation Warfare.” Despite Russia’s label, though, the components of the concept are not entirely new. In fact, Karber argues that the current war has striking parallels with past conflicts, most notably the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which he studied shortly after that war’s conclusion as part of a US “lessons learned” team let by Brig. Gen. Donn Starry.

He also identifies several factors that combined to create the conditions for Russia to develop the strategy it is currently implementing. First, Karber points to weaknesses caused by the post-Cold War demobilization and loss of forces associated with the Soviet Union’s breakup; in some cases, three Soviet divisions were condensed into a single modern brigade, a force structure change that ultimately required Russian military planners to dramatically alter the way Russia would employ its forces. Second, Karber cites the 1990s Chechen wars, in which for the first time, conscripts were deliberately held back from direct action. This professionalized “tip of the spear” dynamic is playing out similarly today in Ukraine, where conscripts are often left in garrison while the remainder of combat units rotate into Ukraine.

17 April 2017

Ukraine to launch big blockchain deal with tech firm Bitfury


By Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss

NEW YORK (Reuters) — Ukraine has partnered with global technology company the Bitfury Group to put a sweeping range of government data on a blockchain platform, the firm’s CEO told Reuters, in a project he described as probably the largest of its kind anywhere.

Bitfury, a blockchain company with offices in the United States and overseas, will provide the services to Ukraine, CEO Valery Vavilov said in an interview Wednesday.

Ukraine’s blockchain initiative underscores a growing trend among governments that have adopted the technology to increase efficiencies and improve transparency.

Blockchain is a ledger of transactions that first emerged as the software underpinning digital currency bitcoin. It has become a key global technology in both the public and private sector given its ability to permanently record and keep track of assets or transactions across all industries.

Ukraine and Bitfury are expected to sign a memorandum of understanding on Thursday, Vavilov said.

24 March 2017

Get Ready, Russia: Ukraine Wants to Build Its Very Own MiG-29 (Sort of)

Dave Majumdar

Ukraine is developing a new indigenous lightweight fighter aircraft fighter according to a new report. However, the project has existed in some form for more than ten years.

According to a report in Jane’s, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced that Kiev would develop its own twin-engine, multirole fighter during a visit to the Ivchenko-Progress engine design bureau. The aircraft—which currently exists as sketch drawing—is called the Legkiy Boiviy Litak or Lightweight Combat Aircraft. It apparently bears more than a passing resemblance to the MiG-29.

Though the prospective Ukrainian fighter might look like a MiG-29, it would use indigenous engines and avionics. The jet would be powered by a pair of AI-322F derivative engines, but the fighter’s avionics would be of both Western and Ukrainian origin. "We will soon be able to create our own aircraft engine for the fighter," Poroshenko said—according to Jane’s.

Reports of an indigenous Ukrainian fighter date back to before 2005, indeed former Antonov designer general Dmitry Kiva made the claim in 2014 that Ukraine can independently develop gunships and fighter aircraft. However, in reality, it is highly dubious if Kiev has the industrial base or money to develop its own jet independently. Particularly, it is highly unlikely—given the nature of the former Soviet industrial base—that Ukraine would have the wherewithal to independently develop avionics for the new jet, particularly the radar.

Geolocated: Russian Military Convoys Near Ukrainian Border

 
This week, the commander of Russia’s Southern Military District announced snap checks for a number of the military units in the south of Russia. Some of these military units were in the Krasnodar Krai, Rostov Oblast, Astrakhan Oblast, and at Russian bases in Armenia and Abkhazia, among other locations.

According to Russian news service TASS, about 6,000 soldiers were involved in the combat readiness check. Earlier in March, another readiness check was instituted for military units in occupied Crimea and the North Caucasus, which are also in the Southern Military District.

We can observe much of the equipment involved in these snap checks through videos shared by ordinary Russians who noticed military convoys driving past them. A number of these videos were shot in the Rostov Oblast, bordering Ukraine. These military convoys were a common sight in the summer of 2014 throughout the Rostov Oblast, where they were transported to large bases that served as the staging ground for Russia’s intervention in the war in the Donbas.

4 March 2017

Donbas Blockade Exposes Political Fault Lines in Ukraine

By: Maksym Bugriy

It has been one month since a group of demobilized Ukrainian soldiers and veterans of the volunteer battalions took it upon themselves (starting on January 25) to enforce a trade embargo with the occupied territories of Donbas (region of eastern Ukraine encompassing the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces) (Euromaidanpress.com, February 6). Increasingly, this blockade of several rail and road routes leading into occupied Donbas is spilling over into political protests in Kyiv. The government is accused of profiting from the trade with the Moscow-backed separatist authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk, which simultaneously provides an economic lifeline to the separatists, thus prolonging the war (Realist, accessed February 22; Euromaidanpress.com, February 9). Some of the blockade’s organizers, Verkhovna Rada (national parliament) members Volodymyr Parasiuk and Semen Semenchenko, joined by the OUN and some other radical nationalist organizations, clashed with police in the capital, on February 19, as they attempted to set up a protest camp in front of President Petro Poroshenko’s administration building (Ukrainian News, February 20). But the police and National Guard forces swiftly broke up the crowd.

Meanwhile, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has exposed a series of subversive operations it says are being masterminded by Russia, which attempt to spark political chaos and potentially give rise to an insurgency in government-controlled areas of Ukraine. Subversive activities and legislative initiatives to promote a pro-Kremlin agenda were explicitly targeted at provincial groups, some of which have expressed clear separatist sympathies. Several of these groups were expected to smuggle firearms into the national capital. One recording published by the SBU quoted a Russian handler requesting that a known Ukrainian separatist use the campaign slogan “The Revolution of Dignity Continues” during public rallies in Kyiv, on February 20–23, commemorating the victims of the EuroMaidan revolution of 2013–2014 (LB.ua, February 21). Whereas, Ukrainian Military Prosecutor Anatoliy Matios posted photos of seized AK and SVD rifles that the so-called “Odesa People’s Republic” group was allegedly attempting to bring onto Kyiv’s central square (Anatolii Matios February 21).

2 March 2017

Ukraine charges Russia with new cyber attacks on infrastructure


By Natalia Zinets

Ukraine on Wednesday accused Russian hackers of targeting its power grid, financial system and other infrastructure with a new type of virus that attacks industrial processes, the latest in a series of cyber offensives against the country. 

Oleksandr Tkachuk, Ukraine's security service chief of staff, said at a press conference that the attacks were orchestrated by the Russian security service with help from private software firms and criminal hackers, and looked like they were designed by the same people who created malware known as "BlackEnergy." 

Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) could not be reached for comment. Moscow has repeatedly denied accusations from Kiev that it has been waging a "cyber war" on Ukraine since relations between the two countries collapsed following Moscow's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of Russian-backed separatist fighting in Ukraine's Donbass region. 

The allegations are the latest sign that Russia's behavior in conflict areas has not changed markedly since Donald Trump became U.S. president last month, calling for warmer relations between Washington and Moscow. 

The new attacks caused some of Ukraine’s cyber defenders to cancel plans to attend this week’s RSA cyber security conference in San Francisco, according to one Western expert familiar with the situation. 

If the allegations are confirmed, that could help Ukraine further its case for the United States to help coordinate a multi-national effort to counter the threat of Russian cyber warfare. 

"There is a global cyber war of Russia against (the) whole world," President Petro Poroshenko told Reuters in an interview in January at the World Economic Forum in Davos. 

28 February 2017

What I Saw in Kyiv

By REP. MIKE QUIGLEY 

Ukraine’s democrats are desperate for American leadership, but they fear Trump will abandon them to Moscow’s clutches. 

I last visited Kyiv in April 2014, when the energy in the city was still electric. For months, Independence Square—dubbed the Euromaidan by Ukrainians seeking to tug their country out from under Russia’s grasp—had been occupied by protesters and police as unrest gripped the city in the dead of the Ukrainian winter. As I stood on Khreshchatyk Street, the Euromaidan was still filled with Ukrainians from every walk of life, demanding a more transparent government, a more democratic society and closer integration with Europe and the West.

The major protests had dissipated by February, when 100 demonstrators were tragically killed by sniper fire. Nevertheless, the protests resulted in a victory for the people of Ukraine. By the time our congressional delegation arrived to assess the situation, former president Victor Yanukovych had fled to Russia and Ukraine was in the early days of organizing a new government. As an American, it felt inspiring. As a member of Congress, it felt essential. As I arrive in Kyiv today, this time as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I am keenly aware that U.S. support for Ukraine is more important than ever.

24 February 2017

Consequences of the Deterioration of the Situation in Donbas

By Anna Maria Dyner and Daniel Szeligowski 

In this bulletin, Anna Maria Dyner and Daniel Szeligowski analyze the deteriorating security situation in the Donbas region of Ukraine and its potential consequences. They conclude that Russia will continue to leverage the ongoing conflict as a way to maintain its influence over its neighbor and break existing Western sanctions. In response, EU countries will need to back Ukraine more vigorously and extend additional humanitarian aid to its people.

The recent exacerbation of hostilities in Ukraine’s Donbas is a reaction by Russia-backed irregular forces to actions taken by the Ukraine Armed Forces (UAF), who since December 2016 have been gradually restoring control over territory along the Minsk-agreed separation line. Russia accuses Ukraine of breaching the Minsk agreement and blames the Ukrainian authorities for the outbreak of fighting. The argument will be used by Russia to lift sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the EU. However, the Ukrainian authorities claim that the UAF’s actions have not violated the Minsk agreement since it provides for the territory in question to be under Ukraine’s control.

Deterioration of the Situation in Donbas

On 29 January, Russia-backed irregulars launched a massive attack on Ukrainian positions around Avdiivka, 10 km north of Donetsk. The offensive was repelled, but more than a dozen Ukrainian soldiers were killed and several dozen more were wounded. Shelling of the city also resulted in civilian casualties. The situation stabilised on February 4 and 5, which allowed some basic infrastructure such as electricity, water and heating to be restored. However, the two sides continue to exchange fire.

23 February 2017

Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia

EUGENE RUMER, RICHARD SOKOLSKY, PAUL STRONSKI, ANDREW S. WEISS

The U.S.-Russian relationship is broken, and it cannot be repaired quickly or easily. Improved personal ties between President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin may be useful, but they are not enough. The Trump administration needs to temper expectations about breakthroughs or grand bargains with Moscow. Instead, the focus should be on managing a volatile relationship with an increasingly emboldened and unpredictable Russian leadership. The real test for any sustainable approach will be whether it advances U.S. interests and values, especially in the wake of Moscow’s reckless meddling in the November presidential election.

Key Themes 

The breakdown in U.S.-Russian relations is a product of long-standing disagreements about the fundamentals of each country’s national security interests and policies. 

The Kremlin’s political legitimacy is increasingly predicated on stoking fears of external threats and anti-Americanism. 

Moscow’s relationship with its neighbors will be inherently unstable due to persistent Russian attempts to dominate their political and economic orientation, and a yawning power and wealth differential. 

Better U.S.-Russian relations are impossible without a major course correction by either or both sides. It is unlikely that Putin will compromise on core Russian interests. Thus, unless Trump is prepared to cave on U.S. principles and interests, relations will remain largely competitive and adversarial. 

22 February 2017

Ukraine accuses Russia of cyberwar amid new attacks on its power grid

By Jason Murdock

Key security officials in Ukraine have accused hackers aligned with the Russian government of targeting its critical infrastructure, including the power grid and the financial systems, using a strain of malware previously linked to a major state-sponsored cyberattack.

Ukraine's security chief, Oleksandr Tkachuk, said on 15 February the attacks were linked to a gang that uses a type of computer malware dubbed BlackEnergy. In an unprecedented attack, the attackers allegedly used it to cause a widespread electricity blackout in Kiev two years ago.

"Russian hackers [have] become an important tool of the aggression against our country," Tkachuk said, as reported by Reuters.

He said the latest round of cyberattacks used a type of malicious software called Telebots with the aim of infecting its national infrastructure.

In late 2016, Slovakian cybersecurity firm Eset, which has previously tracked the BlackEnergy gang, said Telebots malware was used in "targeted cyberattacks against high-value targets in the Ukrainian financial sector." Its main aim was simple: cyber-sabotage.

"It's important to say that these attackers, and the toolset used, share a number of similarities with the BlackEnergy group, which conducted attacks against the energy industry in Ukraine in December 2015 and January 2016," Eset experts wrote in a blog post. "In fact, we think that the BlackEnergy group has evolved into the Telebots group."

19 February 2017

Ukraine charges Russia with new cyber attacks on infrastructure


By Natalia Zinets

Ukraine on Wednesday accused Russian hackers of targeting its power grid, financial system and other infrastructure with a new type of virus that attacks industrial processes, the latest in a series of cyber offensives against the country. 

Oleksandr Tkachuk, Ukraine's security service chief of staff, said at a press conference that the attacks were orchestrated by the Russian security service with help from private software firms and criminal hackers, and looked like they were designed by the same people who created malware known as "BlackEnergy." 

Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) could not be reached for comment. Moscow has repeatedly denied accusations from Kiev that it has been waging a "cyber war" on Ukraine since relations between the two countries collapsed following Moscow's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of Russian-backed separatist fighting in Ukraine's Donbass region. 

The allegations are the latest sign that Russia's behavior in conflict areas has not changed markedly since Donald Trump became U.S. president last month, calling for warmer relations between Washington and Moscow. 

The new attacks caused some of Ukraine’s cyber defenders to cancel plans to attend this week’s RSA cyber security conference in San Francisco, according to one Western expert familiar with the situation. 

17 February 2017

Ukraine Buffeted from East and West

Paul R. Pillar

A visit to Kiev reveals a Ukrainian national identity that has come a long way for a corner of Eurasia that once was known as Little Russia. Ukraine was a large part of the USSR and a major contributor to its economy and military strength, but now, conflict with Russia is a defining characteristic of Ukrainian national consciousness. Parliamentarians of various partisan affiliations, as well as other politically engaged people in the capital both inside and outside government, share a sense of unfair treatment at the hands of Russia. This involves not only the happenings in recent years in Crimea and in the rebellious Donbass region in eastern Ukraine but also an overall Russian presumption that Ukrainians should accept—consistent with old attitudes underlying the “Little Russia” label—being part of Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Ukrainians exhibit much pride in what their nation has accomplished in the 25 years since independence, and in the three years since the “Revolution of Dignity” that toppled former president Viktor Yanukovych. The paving stones that had been torn up in the blood-stained Maidan square during the latter uprising have been put back in place, but with the addition of memorials to those who died there. The memories of Maidan are still recent, and their impact on Ukrainian thoughts and emotions profound.

15 February 2017

** The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea Region: A Brief History

Source Link

This Commentary is the first in a series of essays that will examine the strategic significance of the Black Sea region to the United States and NATO.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 refocused global attention on the strategic significance of a region that rests on the fault lines of two former empires—the Russian and Ottoman Empires—with involvement by European powers, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany. This analysis provides an overview of the region with a view that the past is prologue to the region’s future as restive powers reanimate empirical political and military strategies in a modern context.

Of Conflict and Treaties


Source: Wikipedia.

Six years of conflict between Russia and an overstretched Ottoman Empire from 1768 to 1774 led to the signing of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which provided Russia direct access to the Black Sea region (via the Kerch and Azov ports). Russia was also granted the right to protect Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, and the nominally independent Crimean Khanate was placed under its influence. Nine years after the treaty was signed, popular resentment toward reforms introduced by the Russian co-opted ruling elite, combined with the constant inflow of settlers to the Crimea, fueled regional unrest, giving Catherine II’s envoy, Prince Grigory Potemkin, a long-awaited pretext to annex Crimea through military means with little armed resistance. The Crimean capital of Sevastopol was established the same year, and from 1783 onward, Russia emerged as a growing Black Sea power as the Ottoman Empire slipped onto a slow, declining path.