18 March 2017

** China's Passive Management Strategy




It is useful to look back into history to see how China has managed power in the past. For some 2,000 years, prior to European imperial advancements in the early 19th century, China sat at the center of a regional imperial system, maintaining influence while limiting the need for direct action. Power moved out in rings from the core. There was China proper, protected by an integrated shell of buffer states. For some — such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Manchuria — China was not always dominant, but when outside powers swept across the buffers to change Chinese empires, they at times found themselves ultimately integrated into the Chinese system.

Beyond that were tributary powers, kingdoms that nominally respected China's role in the region. These included areas such as Korea, the Shan state of Burma or even what is now Vietnam — areas where China attempted to expand but reached the limits of its power. Beyond these were so-called barbarian powers, ones that required minimal contact. These not only included places like the Ryukyu Islands, parts of the Malay Peninsula and some of the Central Asian ethnic tribes, but also the more distant European civilizations at times.

China could influence the behavior of its neighbors, but it did so as often as possible by demonstrating power but rarely using it. So long as the neighbors did not fundamentally counter China's core interests, they were largely left to their own devices. In this manner, China could remain central to a regional system while expending little in time, effort or resources to enforce its will. In short, most countries, most of the time, largely accepted the arrangement, both for cultural reasons and because the cost of direct challenge was often too high.

China's crisis with Western imperialism through the 1800s occurred at a time of dynastic and imperial weakness, and China was further weakened by Japanese occupation beginning in the 1930s and then by civil war from 1945 to 1949. The early Mao years were about reconstituting Chinese unity, but also showed the stirrings of Chinese foreign interest in a modern era. Although China under Mao played a role in the overall international Communist drive, this was paired with a longer term and more passive strategy. China made friends, retaining influence through its backing of leaders, from the king of Cambodia to the Nepalese monarchy to the Kim family in North Korea. But China also acted by retaining relations with many alternatives. The idea was that, no matter who came to power, China would have at least some existing relationship to draw on. 

This is how China throughout history has dealt with its periphery and beyond. It's also how it is likely to do so in the future.

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